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Abstract: Antonio Gramsci adopted concepts from others only to 
develop them further and not necessarily along the same path as in their 
original context. ‘Passive revolution’ assisted Vincenzo Cuoco to explain 
the short-lived top down democratisation of the Neapolitan State in 
1799. Gramsci generalised it to explain the Italian Risorgimento and the 
bourgeois state it bore. He denoted it as ‘revolution without a 
revolution’ in contrast with post-1789 France. Besides state formation, 
Gramsci enriched passive revolution by associating it with the political 
subterfuges of ‘transformism’ and ‘technicisation’. He experimented 
with the term further by expanding its historical limits to embrace the 
Fascist regime and, economically, Fordist inroads from across the 
Atlantic. This paper focuses on these (and other) fundamental stages in 
the narrative of the Italian political state and economic development 
accompanying it. Therein, the concept of hegemony – arguably 
Gramsci’s most evocative – is added in order to meaningfully 
contextualise the social formation and social relations within. In this 
case, a ‘negative’ reading of passive revolution portrays it as a failure of 
hegemonic strategy; the people are not successfully educated and 
absorbed within bourgeois universal values. Consequently, besides 
broad socio-pedagogic dynamics, the formal education institution and 
private institutions double their effort to educate hegemonic leadership 
in political and socio-economic terms. This role as expressed by the main 
legislative acts created by the Piedmontese, the Fascists, the Christian 
Democrats and one of Berlusconi’s governments is analysed in order to 
indicate the deliberate links set between formal education and the 
economy through the identification of specific goals promoted by these 
institutions, and, throughout, how passive revolution can assist in 
meaningfully explaining such developments. 
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Introduction 
 
The paper explores linkages between industrial economy and formal 
education provision since the formation of the Italian state in the second half 
of the nineteenth century.  It also explores whether Gramsci’s elaborations on 
the concept of passive revolution assist in explaining meaningfully such 
linkages. A number of cases considered central in the process of state 
formation in Italy provide focus and context. The first part of the paper 
revisits Gramsci’s insights on passive revolution, a useful conceptual tool 
according to him, to interpret epochs with complex transformations 
(Quaderno 15: 62; henceforth Q). State formation following the Risorgimento, 
and the rise of Fascism in the inter-war period are selected for the purpose. 
The second part extends the process of state formation into the period of post-
WWII industrial mass production in the Italian north-west (NW) 
accompanied by the spread of a national market. This is a period of economic, 
political and social transformation stretching from the immediate post-war to 
the early 1970s. The paper adopts the suggestion made by Gramsci to 
understand the early twentieth century expansion of Fordist mass production 
industry as a case of passive revolution. This assists in testing the same 
interpretation for the post-war mass production period. There is also 
reference to the crisis of mass production and concurrent growth of small and 
medium enterprises (SMEs) in industrial districts (IDs) in the Italian north-
east (NE) as a purportedly alternative, territorially-rooted post-Fordist 
development. However, even this internationally-acclaimed industrial 
manufacturing ‘alternative’ suffered from a protracted economic crisis in an 
increasingly globalised economy.  
 
Gramsci’s insistence on equating Fordism with Americanism suggests that 
the industrial work regime was meaningfully explained in combination with 
a new and complementary way of life (Q4: 52, 489). In relation to this and the 
methodological need to connect education with the economy in general, and 
industry in particular, the third part of the paper takes into consideration two 
understandings of education. One refers to formal schooling provision. 
During the critical times leading to the setting up of the formal state and the 
Fascist takeover, both, it is argued here, examples of passive revolution, the 
Piedmontese state in 1859 and the Fascist regime in 1923 formulated and 
implemented legislative tools for formal education provision. Following 
WWII, the growth of a mass production economy was accompanied by an 
education system reform in 1962 introducing mass secondary school 
provision. At the turn of the century, a critical period during which industrial 
manufacturing suffered an unrelenting economic crisis and an unstable 
labour market, the 2003 Moratti Reform introduced a higher education 
programme with higher vocational courses answering calls for a higher skills 
and knowledge basis. This was aligned with policies issued by the European 
Union (EU), the main sponsor of training schemes in Italy. The Moratti 
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Reform was a case of direct association between economic and educational 
agendas as Italy, encouraged by the EU, turned to workfarist policies in order 
to form an employable workforce and compete in attracting investments. 
Besides formal education provision, the other understanding of education 
defines it in broad social terms focusing on socio-pedagogic processes in the 
social formation. This understanding is a re-iteration of Gramsci’s 
elaborations on hegemonic relations and his premonition that all such 
relations are in a general sense pedagogic (Q10: 44). In other words, these 
relations cannot be “restricted to the field of strictly ‘scholastic’ relationships” 
(Borg, Buttigieg and Mayo, 2002, p.9). In this case, in line with the affirmation 
by Marx, the field is “the ideological terrain” of juridical, political, religious, 
artistic and philosophical forms, on which “men become conscious” of their 
social relations. It is on the same terrain that the paper seeks to relate this 
socio-pedagogic element in hegemonic practice to formal education provision 
(Q4: 37). 
 
Contextualising passive revolution and education: The Risorgimento and 
Fascism 
 
Gramsci adopted the concept of passive revolution from Vincenzo Cuoco’s 
reading of the 1799 Neapolitan revolution. In his Saggio storico sulla rivoluzione 
napoletana del 1799 (1801), Cuoco argued the revolution failed because it did 
not reflect the Neapolitan reality and the democratisation process it promoted 
was enforced by a foreign imperial power. Gramsci endorsed this and 
pointed out the alienation of the popular masses in the absence of a 
revolutionary bottom-up process (Q3: 40). Instead, as a top-down revolution 
it pitted the people and their needs against those of the rulers; consequently, 
it was always going to be difficult to gain hegemonic leadership. In the 
ensuing century, Piedmontese initiative in the Risorgimento similarly lacked 
the intellectual and hegemonic leadership to attract a national-popular mass 
support across the peninsula (Q15: 59). Consequently, the formation of the 
Italian state turned out to be a case of territorial assimilation imposed by the 
Piedmontese. Once again, as in the case of 1799, this was a “revolution from 
above” (Morton, 2013, p.38), incomplete and without widespread popular 
support, in which the revolutionary agent was the dominant state not a 
dynamic social class on the rise. Hegemonic leadership, by contrast, recalled 
Machiavelli’s point about the need for power-holders to be accepted by the 
rest rather than merely be satisfied with having acquired and imposed their 
dominance over others.  
 
The distinction between passive revolution as imposed domination on one 
side, and hegemonic leadership on the other, is not to be exaggerated. Whilst 
leadership associated with bottom-up, educational practice in consensus-
building remains analytically distinct from a top-down coercive approach, at 
the same time, in concrete political practice, rule characterised by leadership 
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resorts to coercion whilst domineering regimes are difficult to sustain in the 
long term without hegemonic leadership. For Gramsci, the two were related 
in terms of distinction rather than opposition (Q8: 48, 86). He expressed this 
in two concepts of the state, one as educator and the other as coercer. 
Ideologically different from the caste character of aristocratic rule, bourgeois 
social relations reflected a revolutionary transformation in the legal 
framework and consequently the formal state. This became an ‘educator’, 
intent on culturally absorbing and assimilating the social formation. 
Conversely, when they faced crises that exposed contradictions in their 
attempts at hegemonic leadership, bourgeois rulers were forced to resort to 
coercion. However, along with coercion, they still presented an agenda of 
‘modernising’ reform carefully maintaining initiative and power. This 
required support from intellectuals. Thus, fascist rule was not exhausted by 
coercive measures. Besides Gentile’s direct support, Mussolini’s regime 
received support from independent intellectuals such as Croce who, in 
Gramsci’s words, was “the most powerful machine” for “conformism” (in 
Garin, 1997, p.43), and who did not hesitate to defend Gentile and condone 
Fascist violence (ibid. p.147, n. 6).  
 
Violence, as that perpetrated by the fascists, was not novel even in the Italian 
state’s short history. The May 1898 events when the Extraordinary 
Commissioner Bava Beccaris violently put down demonstrations in Milan 
were not isolated cases. However, as far as conformism was concerned, the 
Piedmontese rulers who had overseen the political unification process 
conjured up their own measures. Within a context of passive revolution, weak 
hegemonic leadership required certain measures to block antagonistic social 
forces. Gramsci argued how, faced with the challenge of subaltern classes, the 
bourgeois class passed from “ethical and paedagogical renovation” to 
transforming the state “into a maze of trenches impeding access to a now 
defensive citadel” (Thomas, 2009, p.148). Defence included technicisation and 
transformism: the former de-politicised political debate and representation, 
the latter was the process of absorption of leading figures from the subaltern 
classes and social movements into the state and civil society. Both contributed 
to passive revolution’s instances of “reformist corrosion” that blocked change 
inimical to the ruling sectors (Q10: 9, p.1227). This associated passive 
revolution with a number of related notions including Quinet’s revolution-
restoration. In the context of the French translation of Cuoco’s passive 
revolution, revolution-restoration referred to reforms that dialectically related 
change with conservation. Historically, what in France had been an active 
revolution leading to ruptural transformation, in Italy turned out to be 
change brought about in small doses, legally, through reforms. This made it 
possible to conserve a working relation, reciprocally beneficial for old and 
new ruling sectors that conserved the economic and political status of the old 
dominant classes besides avoiding agrarian change and the French 
Jacobinism of 1831 and 1848 (Q10: 9). In Buci-Glucksmann’s words, as the 
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ruptural transformation antithesis was absorbed by the conservation thesis, 
the result was a straightjacket on history, a “blocked dialectic” (1980, p. 315). 
Gramsci further qualified this with ‘revolution without a revolution’, i.e., a 
process “through which systemic transformations are achieved by non-
revolutionary means” (Callinicos, 2010, p.492). It confirms the observation 
that the force of passive revolution steadfastly rests on ‘passive’.  
 
Extending the blocked dialectic or revolution-without-revolution to the 
Fascist period promotes the translatability of passive revolution elsewhere, 
away from its Risorgimento baseline. The attribution of the concept to events 
beyond the formation of bourgeois states such as that achieved by the 
Risorgimento was challenged by Callinicos (ibid.). Morton agreed with 
passive revolution’s association with state formation and “the creation of 
state power and an institutional framework consonant with capitalist 
property relations” (2007, p.66). Piedmont’s initiative in the Risorgimento 
pushed its ruling class to take up the task of modernisation and to set the 
conditions necessary for capitalist development. Morton, however, went 
further and argued for the concept’s usefulness “in generating additional 
insights relative to alternative historical and contemporary contexts” (ibid. 
p.79; also, Green, 2011). Gramsci himself opted for the conceptual 
transferability of theory developed in one context and adopted in another. 
This paper follows Gramsci in this regard. The concept of passive revolution 
describes the Fascists who, instead of the promised revolutionary 
transformation of the corrupt liberal regime, conserved power circles through 
state legislation and a planned economy, guaranteeing continued capitalist 
appropriation. Corporativism not only integrated restive labour in power 
hierarchies but was popular amongst wage-earning middle class sectors 
because it protected them from what Gramsci described, in a letter to Tatiana, 
as precarious employment and long term unemployment (Gramsci, 2013, 
p.275). Gramsci queried such continuity of the bourgeois state, and the role of 
the Fascists therein, in terms of two principles from Marx’s ‘Preface’ to A 
Contribution towards the Critique of Political Economy (1894): “No social 
formation disappears as long as the productive forces which have developed 
in it still find room for further forward movement” and besides, “does not set 
itself tasks for whose solution the necessary conditions have not already been 
incubated” (Q15: 17). Whilst the ‘old’ dominant agrarian class struggled to 
control peasant rebellion, the new industrial bourgeoisie was still struggling 
to establish the necessary conditions for its hegemonic leadership and, 
consequently, allied with a coercive political regime to suffocate inimical 
incubation.  
 
Gramsci mapped out a basic condition for bourgeois hegemony as he recalled 
both the concept of the bourgeois state as ‘educator’ and the need to maintain 
balance between coercive practice and modernising reforms: “Each social 
group has its own type of school, intended to perpetuate a specific traditional 
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function, ruling or subordinate” (in Buttigieg, 2002, p.130). When the 
Moderate Party in Piedmont adopted and intensified the parliamentary 
strategy of transformism to stabilise and guarantee continuity for its rule, the 
need was felt to devise other strategies at state institutional level to prop 
modernisation and educational conditions for the establishment and social 
reproduction of a bourgeois society. In 1859, legislation for formal education 
provision in Piedmont anticipated political unification. Known as the Casati 
Law, it became the first nation-wide Education Act to form the king’s new 
subjects. The elementary school, Gramsci pointed out, was to fight ignorance 
and superstition, and to teach natural law basic for the understanding, 
adaptation to, and control of the natural world. Supported by faith in 
academic standards and examinations  later to be defined as traditional 
schooling (Entwistle, 1979)  Gramsci argued in its support. For him, amongst 
others, it imparted the perception of social and state law made by man and 
therefore potentially unmade by man. Overall, just as the bourgeois state was 
necessary to break away from feudal economic shackles, similarly, this 
education law was required to assist in emancipation from folklore. 
Considering folklore as something bizarre, strange, ridiculous or picturesque 
did not assist (Q1: 89). It was better viewed as a conception of the world held 
by certain sectors of society, neither elaborate nor systematised, but rather a 
multiplicity of fragments from conceptions of the world pertaining to the 
past. It could not be ignored. For Gramsci, formal education had to face 
folklore in order to overcome it and realign modern and popular culture 
cleansed from folkloristic rituals, witchcraft, etc. He retorted against pseudo-
scientific approaches such as De Man’s that suggested over-riding positivist 
science in order to conserve folklore. Whilst the Sardinian promoted the 
study of popular psychology, this was intended to educate and transform not 
conserve (Q3: 48). 
 
The next major education reform was carried out under Fascist rule. The 
Fascist Party presented itself as a revolutionary organisation prepared to use 
coercion to impose order on rebellious workers. At the same time, as with the 
Piedmontese, the Fascists were aware that rule required more than, in their 
case, the physical methods of factory council break-ups or squadristi treatment 
of political opposition. Whilst Mussolini (1979, p.227) in his 1923 article ‘Force 
and Consensus’ wrote that physical and armed force were permanent 
requirements for any government (including a Liberal one), Bottai, Fascist 
minister of Corporations and Education, Governor of Rome and Addis 
Ababa, wrote about the need to control violence and illegality in order to gain 
consensus and construct a leading group without the party duplicating State 
institutions (Cassese, 1971). The more Fascists resorted to coercion, and 
imposed domination, the less they could boast of leadership. In 1923, during 
his twenty months as Mussolini’s minister of instruction, Gentile elaborated a 
Reform of Education in which the secondary school was deliberately set up to 
prepare future leaders. This was separated from a lower status school for the 
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commoners. Gramsci criticised the social class bias of the new school system 
also for its overtly vocational concerns and especially the early age students 
entered such schools. The child of a traditionally intellectual family “has 
numerous advantages over his comrades, and is already in possession of 
attitudes learnt from his family environment” (in Borg, Buttigieg and Mayo, 
2002, p.11). The division between classical and vocational schools would 
conserve and consolidate the social class divide. As for political leadership, 
this was eventually transformed with the fascistisation of the state, society 
and culture. In 1931, state university professors were forced to sign an oath in 
favour of the regime. This was not ready to tolerate alternative, and even less 
antagonistic, intellectual leadership; the Church and the Socialist Party 
recommended their men to sign up. 
 
If the Casati Law was not less supportive of a social class divide than 
Gentile’s Reform, the Fascists had other things on their mind. Gramsci 
criticised curricular change in the Gentile Reform. Although it was projected 
as progressive for removing dogmatism in teaching science and in learning 
by heart concrete facts, Gramsci disagreed with Gentile’s decision. Giroux 
emphasised Gramsci’s distinction between “learning facts that enlarged one’s 
perception of the larger social order and simply gathering information” (2002, 
p.49). In this case, the Sardinian considered such dogmatism as indispensable 
to fight folklore. Furthermore, when eventually the Fascists integrated 
religious knowledge in the Reform, paradoxically it ended up incorporating 
dogmatism ‘par excellence’. To Gramsci, this dogmatism meant abandoning 
education. By the time religion was incorporated in 1929 in the secondary 
school, against Gentile’s protestations, even Liberal Democracy was 
abandoned. The Fascist regime, in spite of its strong anti-clerical roots, had 
emboldened the role of religion in state schools over that sanctioned by the 
Casati Law. Similarly, as mentioned above, it went back on its promise to 
revolutionise politics from the corrupt ways of the Liberals (and their passive 
revolution).  
 
Following this brief explanation of Gramsci’s conceptual elaboration of 
passive revolution in relation to the Risorgimento state formation and the 
Fascist regime, both associated with establishing major schooling legislation 
here understood in terms of hegemonic instruments, the next section 
introduces the post-war context, in Gramsci’s words, by means of a sequence 
of static photographs illustrating in broad terms industrial development (Q7: 
24). 
 
The industrial context in the second half of the twentieth century in Italy’s 
north-west and north-east 
 
In the early post-WWII decades, Italy was “a striking example” of a less-
developed economy achieving “remarkable” growth (Dunlop and Greco, 
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2006, p.5). During the war it lost 85% of its merchant navy, one-third of its 
railways, and approximately one-fifth of its industrial plant and equipment 
(Eichengreen, 2007, p.54). However, whilst there was extensive damage, it 
could quickly be repaired. Besides, Italian industry opportunistically turned 
to profit the US Marshall Aid Plan that paid for new machinery and other 
requirements. It was able to exploit the transition to post-war market 
openings within an international economy that had to shift from war to 
peace. This included war-inspired technological development transformed to 
serve commercial and civilian purposes. Post-war mass production industry 
was, in part, a follow-up of the dismemberment and restructuring of war 
industries. The state contributed by assisting both the large exporting 
industry and internal demand with direct investments in infrastructure and 
setting up conditions for a national market. Large mass production 
companies received support for their investment from the banking system 
including Banca Commerciale, Credito Italiano, and their off-shoot 
Mediobanca, controlled by the state through IRI, the Institute for Industrial 
Reconstruction. State-owned companies, including IRI, but also ENI, the 
National Hydrocarbons Agency, and ENEL, the Italian National Agency for 
Electric Energy contributed heavily to post-war industrial reconstruction. The 
territory of the Italian NW hosted the leading capitalist families that 
promoted and thrived from this industrial restructuring and growth. 
 
Earlier on, immediately following the Liberation, FIAT, Pirelli, Falck, 
Montecatini and Marzotto owners and managers were unavailable, still in 
hiding. Special commissioners took over. However, Communist Party leader 
Togliatti ruled out taking over the factories and favoured a policy of national 
unity: the factory was not to be the context of class conflict. This was 
accompanied by the restoration of the bourgeois padroni, owners and 
managers of industry. When they were restored, government exited the 
labour-capital relations scene and that, in practice, translated into a policy of 
non-interference in capital’s control. Whilst Fascist corporativism was 
dismantled, and the new practice of shop-floor relations ranged from 
threatening workers to German-like co-determination (Magnani, 1997), 
eventually the representatives of big capital began to adopt a tougher stance 
in labour-capital relations giving enterprises a monarchic regime under which 
consultation was useless and property rights unassailable. Restoration of 
bourgeois dominance amidst change not only reflected passive revolution’s 
basic dynamic, it also reflected “the survival and re-organisation of state 
identity through which social relations are reproduced in new forms 
consonant with capitalist property relations” (Morton, 2007, p.68). These 
relations were assisted by the abundance of labour supply from war-to-peace 
reconversion, the South, and wage-dependent peasantry, the braccianti. This 
permitted a substantial stagnation of wage levels. Although, German and 
northern European industry lured Italian labour following European 
Community membership, profits for native capital remained high as the 
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wealth from the so-called miraculous growth decades was unequally 
distributed. During the 1950s (1949-58) there was no nation-wide strike. By 
then, the Italian Communist Party (PCI) was a political actor and not a class 
war institution; integrated in the liberal politics of representation, it 
manoeuvred for electoral success.  
 
Hirst and Zeitlin (1997) defined their ideal type model of mass production as 
the “manufacture of standardized products in high volumes using special-
purpose machinery and predominantly unskilled labor” (p.221). At the same 
time, it was more than production and shop-floor relations. Mass production 
was accompanied by a vision that promoted economic, political and cultural 
paths necessary to follow for the host social formation requiring a broad 
educational effort. Gramsci had anticipated this argument in what he called 
Americanism – a parallel way of life to Fordist mass production industry. It 
led the Sardinian to face a question of socio-pedagogic relevance in terms of 
the reciprocal correspondence between economic needs and general culture’s 
response to them (Q4: 52). Whilst in a letter to Tatiana (Gramsci, 2013, pp.58-
60) he explained how Ford’s inspectors assured employees’ readiness to work 
by controlling their private lives in terms of food, bed, volume of rooms, 
hours of rest, the sexual question, and complementing these with higher 
salaries and demographic rationalisation, in terms of the rest of society, this 
can also be illustrated by observing the role carried out by the media in post-
war Italy. Intellectuals representing the industrial alta borghesia (upper 
bourgeoisie) of the Italian NW formed another sector amongst the borghesi; 
besides leaders of political parties and administrators of the central state, 
these included intellectuals working within the dominant mass media. In this 
way, the metropolitan industrial borghesi of the NW built links with 
intellectuals in civil society.  RAI, the Italian state television, centralised 
power to form public opinion and impose a political agenda at the national 
scale, and at the same time, sustain consumer society.  
 
By the 1970s, however, the leading mass production sector in the NW was in 
crisis and underwent change. The three regions of the NW – Lombardy, 
Piedmont and Liguria – were the most industrialised regions in the pre- and 
post-war periods but only the first two registered strong industrial growth 
throughout the earlier post-war decades. By the 1980s, industrial decline 
spread in both regions. Nonetheless, indications of a mass production crisis in 
the NW were accompanied by the protracted presence of leading industrial 
companies. Based on 1993 data collected by Consob, the National 
Commission for Companies and Stock Exchange, Barca et al. (1997) 
concluded that Pirelli, Falck and Fiat, founded at the end of the previous 
century, continued to feature as dominant or relevant players at the 
beginning of the 1990s. At the same time, although the industrial alta borghesia 
of the NW represented by the industrialists’ association of Confindustria 
boasted a dominant status, it was unable to overcome investment difficulties, 
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and was forced to follow the dictates of EU rules of competition, and turn to 
market capital shares. In the major companies, a tripolar structure of power 
evolved consisting of founding family, management, and the novel presence 
of banks and insurance companies. Another social sector had found a place in 
the sun. At the top of still dominant industrial capital in Italy, the notion of 
concurrent change and conservation in the social relations of capital was 
illustrated by this alliance as an adaptation to change in the capital base. 
 
As the decline of mass production organisation in the NW continued, the 
large companies restructured in an attempt to boost their resilience by 
increasing the number of small and medium-small firms controlled through 
scission, acquisition and start-ups. In the 1970s, either through direct 
investment or subcontracting, production was transferred from the 
metropolitan centres to the surrounding provinces, but also along the Alpine 
foothills and the Po to the neighbouring NE with its industrial district (ID) 
model populated by artisans and a skilled workforce. Industrial 
manufacturing in the Italian NE especially that associated with the ID 
organisation was not all subordinated to or controlled by the NW. From 1970 
to 1995, according to Anastasia & Coro` (1996, in Odella, 2002), gross 
manufacturing product in the Veneto region in the NE grew 200% whereas 
the national growth rate was 75%. This success was the result of exports in 
footwear, textiles, clothing, household appliances, etc. and related machinery. 
With noteworthy global shares in their niche sectors, district SMEs matched 
the industrial output of Piedmont and Lombardy. The CNEL (National 
Council for the Economy and Work) 2002 report Italia Multinazionale 2000 
indicated that during the 1990s, SMEs not only “offset the difficulties and 
sometimes the backwardness of the large firms”, they also started investing 
abroad especially in countries of central and eastern Europe (pp.3-4).   
 
The industrialisation of the NE was described as a bottom-up, culturally-
embedded, productive outgrowth (Brusco, 1986; Belussi, 1999). Was it a case 
of petty bourgeois anti-passive revolution? The story of the modern Veneto in 
the NE and its irruption on the national stage has not been written yet, 
argued Corriere della Sera journalist Di Vico, and if not perhaps a revolution, 
for him it was a discontinuity. When eventually it is narrated, he wrote, “It 
will be possible to better see and understand the breadth and length of the 
discontinuity that, from the Veneto, gave rise to the Nordest” (2012, p.5). This 
absent narrative structured within Gramsci’s conceptual passages in 
collective political consciousness meant that the economic and political 
interests of the NE were not successfully imposed at the national scale. This 
would have been the stage when each member of the social class not only 
became aware of corporate interests, but also how these must “transcend the 
corporate limits of the purely economic class, and can and must become the 
interests of other subordinate groups too” (Q13: 17). Di Vico wrote about an 
“establishment” that was still missing in the NE (2012, p.6) and how this 
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meant fragmentation and the projection of various visions from the same 
territory. There was an explanation. Ultimately, as Dunford (2006) observed, 
the increased concentration on Milan reflected the restructuring of industry in 
the shape of value adding specialised service companies providing 
immaterial, knowledge-based products, consultancy, media and 
communication services with their headquarters in this metropolitan city. 
Whilst it left an impact on the productive world, the growth of a tertiarised 
economy in Milan, visible in sites of consumption, transport systems, centres 
of innovation, knowledge production and transmission, as well as the re-use 
of deserted factories, turned it into citta` infinita, a city without limits (Aldo 
Bonomi, 2008).  
 
Broadening the spatial scale, Dunford observed how the regional system in 
Italy formed part of “an inter-regional and international division of labour in 
the sector” (2006, p.2). His studies on textile and clothing industries (TCI) 
exposed how the district unit was part of a system inter-connecting different 
spatial scales, including the Italian NE and NW, thus identifying these as 
more than mere territorial neighbours. Worse than a passive revolution, for 
the petty bourgeois productive sectors of the NE, this would turn out a failed 
one; the dominant social sector remained the bourgeoisie. The 2005 edition of 
the Multinational Italy report (Mariotti and Mutinelli, 2005) reconfirmed how, 
in terms of exports and employment, IDs were able to sustain their success. 
However, the report remarked about limits in their size, management, 
finances, and access to information about and experience of international 
capital markets. It suggested the way forward was in medium-sized firms. 
These already formed part of IDs, as attested by their inclusion in the 
acronym SME, however, the ones pointed out in the report – Mapei, 
Socotherm, Cementir and CF Gomma – were multinational enterprises 
(MNEs), each leading a group of companies rather than an ID. These could 
compete in foreign investment markets. In his March 06, 2004 article ‘The 
Parabola of the North East’, political scientist Ilvo Diamanti concisely 
interpreted Montezemolo’s victory over Tognana in the race for the 2004 
presidency of Confindustria as “a sign of the decline or at least the eclipse” of 
the autonomous Veneto ID model. Montezemolo represented the interests of 
large industry in the NW, Tognana represented those of the upstart SMEs, 
especially those from the Veneto. With the NE declared in crisis when 
compared with its growth period, representatives of large capital in the NW 
conserved and consolidated their hold on Confindustria, the institutional 
representation of dominant industrial capital in Italy, whilst embracing the 
bourgeois and petty bourgeois from the NE. 
 
Passive revolution and education 
 
Gramsci wrote about national variants in Fordist development (Q22: 2). At 
the same time, as can be illustrated in the post-war decades, in spite of 
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“specific national circumstances”, variants Aglietta argued, “cannot cast 
doubt on the fundamental fact that all Western countries benefited from a 
common growth regime” (1998, p. 57, fn. 12). Commonality was also 
expressed in the active role of the political state. The support of the political 
state in Italy (just as much as the post-Risorgimento Piedmontese and the 
inter-war Fascist regimes) was already pointed out above. It was a 
continuation of the political response to a call to modernise and what Gramsci 
had defined as the need to rationalise society (Q1: 61). It underscored the 
assumption singled out by Entwistle that runs throughout this paper of 
Gramsci’s understanding “a theory of education to be integral to political 
theory” (1979, p. 1).  
 
 … every State is ethical as long as one of its most important functions 
is to raise the great mass of the population to a specific cultural and 
moral level, a level (or type) which corresponds to the requirements 
for developing the forces of production, and therefore to the interests 
of the dominant classes. (Q8: 179) 
 
In a period of complex social class transformation in post-war Italy, this 
became strategically sensitive for hegemonic purposes. If the aristocratic 
ruling class was a ‘closed’ class blocking social mobility, according to 
Gramsci, “the bourgeois class poses itself as an organism in continuous 
movement, capable of absorbing the entire society, assimilating it to its own 
cultural and economic level” and this, as mentioned above, transformed the 
role of the bourgeois state into one of “educator” (Q8: 2). This thought serves 
as backdrop, in the section that follows, to understand the 1962 Education 
Reform and, in the next section, to eventually review that of 2003, with the 
political state reacting to transformations in the social formation especially in 
the face of opposition and/or economic restructuring. 
 
Formal education provision of 1962 
 
Contextualising the 1962 and 2003 Education Reforms (just as much as 1859 
and 1923) into a passive revolution reading assists in unearthing a basic 
commonality in what otherwise might be interpreted as a disconnected 
sequence of events. With passive revolution understood as embracing 
revolution-without-revolution strategies via the state to counter actual or 
potential popular activism within a context of complex transformation, it is 
possible to suggest a pattern embracing these events. If 1859 followed the 
Piedmontese political leadership’s role in state formation vis-a-vis the 
challenge of the radical liberal and nationalist supporters from the 
Risorgimento wars and uprisings; and, 1923 was the Fascist state’s response 
to the social unrest following WWI and the impact of the Russian revolution 
on the working class in Italy; in 1962, the Christian Democrat (DC) leadership 
was replying to WWII destruction, political state restructuring, and the strong 
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communist challenge. However, besides the top-down aspect of passive 
revolution in which opposition is engaged (absorbed or destroyed), there is 
also the need for a long-term strategy that thrives towards setting up a 
hegemonic regime and catering for its social reproduction in which 
dominance is transformed into leadership as it attracts active support. The 
formal education system has a role in this.    
 
The immediate circumstance for the DC school initiative was a PCI earlier 
draft bill of a secondary school for all along the same lines as those of the 
eventual DC document. Concurrently, the Christian Democrats had to 
overcome an internal challenge by assuring the party’s right-wing that 
although the state would have authority over teaching, the Church and other 
private organisations were constitutionally guaranteed the freedom to set up 
their schools. So, preceded by a Senate initiative dated 21st January 1959 by 
the communist senators Ambrogio Donini and Cesare Luporini that intended 
to promote an education geared towards the civil and political goal of a 
participative citizenship, and, propped by the Socialists who formed part of 
the government coalition (especially their deputy Codignola), the Christian 
Democrats acquiesced and Secondary School for All became law in 1962. It 
made attendance obligatory up to the age of fourteen. It doubled the student 
population and implemented the right to free schooling for all sanctioned by 
article 34 of the Italian Constitution. 
 
In social class terms, the 1859 Casati Law led to a mere 0.1% of the population 
actually following what ultimately amounted to either an elite humanist path 
that led to university or a middle and technical school/institute path. 
Implementation was disappointing and besides, the state left the pre-
Elementary age-group to private provision. The 1923 Gentile Reform, as has 
been discussed above, effectively consolidated the class divide. In the post-
war liberal democracy, the 1962 Act promoted an egalitarian ideology (even if 
the elite kept their education options open). This answered specific moral and 
cultural requirements. Urbanisation and lifestyles determined by mass 
industrialisation and a novel national market required a mass society. When 
Bowles and Gintis (2002) revised their 1976 Schooling in capitalist America 
claiming it gave “insufficient attention to the contradictory pressures 
operating on schools, particularly those that emanate from the labor market, 
which we stressed, and from the democratic polity, which we should have 
emphasized more” (ibid. p.15), they were pointing out a contradiction that in 
their earlier classic had under-emphasised “future roles as citizens, family 
members, and the like” (ibid. p.13). In Italy, and in relation to socialisation 
processes promoted by the 1962 Act, this created difference between the 
generation that provided ample streams of unschooled rural labour in 
immediate post-war industrial development and that of their children 
socialised within the new state-supported education system in increasingly 
affluent societies, associated with rising expectations. In 1969, Codignola’s 
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law – Tristano Codignola the son of Ernesto, Gentile’s major collaborator in 
the promulgation of the 1923 law – appeased the social pressure raised by 
students in alliance with workers: the doors of the university were opened for 
the generation that had benefitted from the 1962 reform. Nonetheless, the 
contradiction pointed out by Bowles & Gintis does not eliminate the 
consideration of limits and dependence of education provision in relation to 
the labour market and how this, in turn, related to what ultimately remained 
a class-divided social formation on one side and democratic polity on the 
other (Colombo et al. 2006); another aspect of concurrent change and 
conservation.  
 
Turn-of-century education provision 
 
State welfare had accompanied post-war economic recovery and growth in 
advanced industrial nations. It sustained social integration and reproduction. 
State welfare was not exclusively a matter of money contributions but also 
included, amongst others, provision of the socially enabling right to a state-
supported school system. The European Commission’s Eurydice study, Two 
Decades of Reform in Higher Education in Europe: 1980 Onwards (2000) observed 
that “across all European countries, in the latter half of the 20th century, the 
dawning realisation [was] that a high level of education had become a 
prerequisite for the cultural, social and economic welfare of democratic 
societies”. This was the period of the Secondary School for All Education Act 
of 1962. In the final decades of the century, faced with the need to establish 
the conditions that sustained capitalist continuity in the midst of the crisis 
faced by metropolitan mass production, the political state replied with 
another revolution-without-revolution transition; it did not shrivel or 
disappear, as some assumed, but changed from social welfare to workfare 
business-benefitting concerns (Jessop, 2006). Different from the immediate 
post-war education curriculum of a nation-wide, citizenship-based 
defascistisation project, Moratti’s turn-of-century ministerial decisions 
promoted vocationalism and upgrading of technical and apprenticeship 
provision on a regional basis.  
 
Besides curriculum change, there was organisational restructuring; it was the 
strategic option adopted in industry but also in public administration and 
formal education. Industrial capital opted for a more deconcentrated 
organisational restructuring through scission and decentralisation. In the 
latter decades of the century it took the guise of the organisational structure 
of the group of companies. Barca et al. (1997) described its pyramidal 
structure as consisting of “juridically autonomous firms” which, “starting 
from a common apex were linked in cascades by relations of control that 
separated one from another” (p.155). This structure was useful because 
decisions were made autonomously at different levels by the various units 
without affecting the core capital at the top of the group. Public 
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administration was similarly decentralised following the reform formulated 
in Law 59/97 with its deliberations on control powers and decentralisation, 
standard-setting and autonomy. Administrative provisions redistributed 
power amongst state, region, metropolitan city, province and local 
government as set by the October 18, 2001 Legge Tre amendment of the 
Constitution’s Chapter V following a referendum in August of the same year 
(Isfol, 2008, pp.26, 245). Significantly, just as mass education had followed in 
the footsteps of mass production, a decentralised structure of education 
followed both industrial and public administration decentralisation. Change 
and conservation dynamics, features associated with passive revolution, were 
witnessed in the Reform which, in line with public administration reform 
Law 59/97, restructured the Ministry of Education. It led to the decentralised 
Uffici Scolastici Regionali (USR), responsible to carry out ministerial functions 
at the regional scale. Change was more formal than substantive. Centralised 
bureaucratic control was conserved and redistribution of powers not carried 
out.  Law 53/03 and Presidential Decree 319/03, in passive revolution jargon, 
restructured but ultimately restored centrism, or what Ribolzi (2006) defined 
as neo-centrism. Although regions successfully challenged the central state in 
the constitutional court on conflicting interpretations of legislative decrees in 
education, the final say was still left with central authority.  
 
Not only did education restructuring develop alongside a resilient old 
establishment, but within regional economic flourishing, central politicians 
such as Bossi, Casini, and Buttiglione gave orders to local followers: “the 
result was an unending to-and-fro by the entire political class in the directions 
of Rome and Milan” (Mazzaro, 2012, pp.50-1). Similarly, the Unification 
legacy of economic unevenness across the peninsula was consolidated. 
Education and training statistics following the Moratti 2003 Education and 
Training Reform confirmed the North-South divide, a birthmark of the 
nation. The subnational scales of regions, provinces and municipalities 
purportedly increased their say in social and public policies but it was 
bourgeois sectors already influential at the local and regional scale that 
increased their powers over the public sector expected to be more responsive. 
Significantly, Lombard and Veneto protagonists profited most and they 
already had a strong say at the national scale with the northern alliance of 
Forza Italia and the Lega Nord in power.  
 
Taking advantage of the regional prerogative to establish training 
programmes, a distinctive trait of the Moratti 2003 Reform, and propped by 
decentralisation, Lombard and Veneto regional governments prepared 
workfarist courses directly profitable in the labour market. They opted to 
chase where the economic interests of leading bourgeois sectors in the two 
regions lay – capacity-building professional formation in industry and 
services. In the increased attraction of vocational and education training, the 
North-South divide re-emerged as the North hosted twice as many courses 
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and attracted three times as many participants as the rest (Isfol, 2008). 
Apprenticeship figures confirmed: 10.2% in the South, 9.1% in the Centre, 
17.6% in the NW and, significantly, 28.9% in the NE (ibid.). Data showed a 
dynamic, efficiently administered North; an intermediate Centre; and a 
dysfunctional South facing immobility and a host of other difficulties. Thirty 
years after Bagnasco (1978) published his Three Italies Model (NW; NE and 
Central; South), the NE had closed in on the NW but the divisions were 
substantially conserved. The transformation of the NE was reflected in 
education: from the territory with one of the highest absentee records at the 
national scale in the 1960s, it became a frontrunner along with the NW in 
participation statistics of formal higher technical and apprenticeship courses 
promoted by the Moratti Reform; these courses contended with those from 
university and were attributed equivalent status.  
 
The convergence of the Veneto with Lombardy in supply-side measures in 
education, it is argued here, is the activity that reflects more clearly the 
leadership of the NW over the NE. Transformation at the regional scale 
represented by education statistics is meaningfully understood by 
contextualising it in the discourse of economic social relations and 
accumulation processes where the ‘old’ survives and the ‘new’ finds it 
difficult to emerge. For Brenner & Glick, the Fordist “rise of scientific 
management or Taylorism-Fordism” had been “a moment of discontinuity” 
in terms of “mechanization, deskilling and capitalist control over the labour 
process”, and “sufficiently sharp to mark – indeed partially to bring about – 
the transition from one regime of accumulation to the next” (Brenner and 
Glick, 1991, pp.57-8). Amin wrote of a “loose” recall of rules of management 
and mass production intensive accumulation processes from the 1920s and 
1930s – when Gramsci contributed to  Fordism’s conceptual elaboration – to 
the stable post-war growth that stretched until the 1970s (2003, p.9).  
 
The transition from Fordism to the post-1970s flexible specialisation 
alternative (such as the ID) did not represent a “transition from one to 
another regime of capital accumulation” but “a further phase of an ongoing, 
though hardly continuous, evolution” envisioned as “radically undermining” 
the “bastions of skilled workers’ control” (Brenner and Glick, 1991, pp.58-9). 
Mechanisation and deskilling had undermined the traditional artisan from 
the Italian NE category as survival meant reaching out to the national market 
and exports. Furthermore, if during the Italian post-war ‘miracle’, labour was 
subordinated to managerial leadership as a fundamental condition 
supporting capital accumulation, in the latter decades of the century, the 
small petty bourgeois producers suffered a similar experience of 
subordination to powerful bourgeois sectors (Arrighetti and Seravalli, 1997). 
The large number of small firms in the tanning, textile, sport shoes, knitwear 
or furniture districts did not indicate an absence of capitalist accumulation 
but rather the concentration of control in the hands of a few powerful 
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families. Thus, whilst education statistics indicated change in the Veneto, 
accumulation processes were conserved. Compared with those in other 
regions, Veneto industry, including that in district territory, had higher levels 
of capital accumulation processes and technical progress (Becattini, 2001). 
 
Conservation was also observed in terms of the social formation. Based on 
Marco Biagi’s work on the labour market (shot dead before the employment 
law nicknamed after him saw the light), the Moratti Reform followed the 
premise that education has a fundamental role in social change and in social 
mobility. It had been the same in the 1960s. Statistical results were 
nevertheless disappointing and proved the argument made at other points in 
the paper of conservation in the midst of mostly purported change. An 
official 2009 report by the regional government of the Veneto quoted data 
indicating that social mobility in Italy was failing; where it did occur, mobility 
depended on parental social class background and related level of education. 
Records showed 30% moved but the children of working-class parents, 
followed by those from a wage-dependent middle-class background were 
relatively less mobile. Social class membership was conserved in a society in 
which, since the post-war, transformations had led from rural to industrial, 
and then to openings in middle class employment. By the end of the century, 
mobility became more difficult and created the inter-generational relations 
crisis of an older generation having gained mobility via economic change 
without the possibility of guaranteeing the same to the younger generation. 
The report also pointed out the “elite nature” of the university despite 
reforms, and sardonically concluded, “Higher education has still not 
managed to provide a direct route for social improvement” (Regione Veneto, 
2009, p.10).   
 
The continental scale 
 
The Moratti Reform’s promotion of a vocationalist drive for higher skills was 
in line with similar goals concurrently promoted by the EU. It also fell in line 
with historical antecedents narrated above that led to developments in Italy 
characterised by the impact of developments abroad. Thus, relations between 
Austria and France, and the decline of Spanish influence affected the 
Risorgimento and assisted the Piedmontese to form a bourgeois state over an 
uneven but preponderantly provincial and agricultural geo-economic reality. 
The Russian revolution and the activities of colonial powers affected the rise 
of Fascism as this took on the role of protector defending industrial bourgeois 
property through state-imposed order on rebellious labour. The post-war 
Christian Democrats governed the restructuring of a defeated dictatorial state 
transformed into a liberal democratic nation that integrated labour within its 
folds but principally assisting dominant Fordist capital by providing broad 
investments via the State. Whilst Gramsci had already discussed US-led 
Fordist expansion in Europe, the post-war sequel consolidated the role of the 
 
 
 
 
66 
US in Europe; it answered to political, economic and military needs of the US. 
This blocked inter-capitalist warfare but also oiled the “growth of global 
aggregate demand” (Gill, 1994, p. 96). Summarising Gill, if one is to search for 
the origins these are to be traced back to the “outward expansion of emerging 
(American) social forces” as they internationalised the principles and forms of 
the New Deal, in terms of a “Fordist capital-intensive, mass consumption 
accumulation” (ibid.). 
 
At the end of the century, an increased presence of mobile capital 
accompanied the crisis of mass production industry in the metropolitan 
centres of advanced industrial economies. The Single European Act of 1987 
constituted “an area without internal frontiers in which the free movement of 
goods, persons, services and capital is ensured”. The Maastricht Treaty that 
set up the EU constituted a heavy institutional armature fundamentally 
protecting and promoting the mobility of capital and was bound to impact 
on, rather than open-endedly intertwine with, national and subnational 
scales. One notes significant differences that affected the working class when 
comparing the world that bred Maastricht with the one that bred the Treaty 
of Rome. At the time of the Rome Treaty, employment policies were bound to 
the national scale, where state welfare policies were adopted. Conversely, 
wrote Jessop (2008, p. 213), the Maastricht convergence criteria made it harder 
for member-states to break out of neo-liberal assumptions in an ideological 
climate constructed over Reagan in the US and Thatcher in the UK, along 
with the collapse of Soviet communism. Maastricht and the Growth and 
Stability Pact, combined, required the political state to go ahead with “public 
spending cuts or constraints, social security and welfare reforms, and more or 
less significant privatization of state-owned enterprises and 
commercialization of public services” (ibid.).  
 
Moratti’s education reform not only followed a historic pattern characterised 
by the impact of developments abroad on Italian affairs, it also reflected a 
new phase observed across Europe in terms of education priorities. 
Increasingly, policy affirmed an economistic thrust. The Eurydice study 
mentioned above sensed a shift in higher education to a provision “rooted in 
economic causes”, highlighting “competitiveness and responsiveness to the 
changing demands of economic life and the workplace by focusing education 
and research on required new skills and technologies” (European 
Commission, 2000). From an earlier post-war attention to social and cultural 
welfare in education, a shift of focus was observed to concerns directly 
related to work. The EU Commission’s Lisbon Memorandum of 2000 (the 
‘Strategy’) expressed the master narrative of the continent “becoming the 
most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world”. It 
propped the member-states to outperform others in global competitiveness 
especially the challenge from North American, SE Asian and BRIC 
economies. To achieve this goal, the EU steadfastly promoted workfarist 
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goals in education. The assumption was that ‘knowledge’ had the potential to 
generate economic growth, prosperity and employment. Starting from the 
crisis of the 1970s, workfarism insisted on supply-side policies to boost 
national competitiveness on the basis of over-riding business-benefitting 
measures (Jessop, 2003). The modernising Casati Law, the consensus-building 
Gentile Reform, and the DC’s Secondary School Reform accompanying 
‘national’ industry and market were to be followed by the higher skill and 
knowledge basis of a continent in competition with the rest of the world. 
 
Studying social science discourse in EU research programmes, Kuhn (2006) 
highlighted how a technology-driven information society had become a 
learning society biased toward economic issues as endorsed by the highest 
political authorities. In turn, learning society turned into a knowledge-based 
society (KBS) as it became a strategic aim and guiding principle for EU 
research, general policy-making, and educational research programmes. The 
vague and so promising concept of a learning society became ‘economic’ 
when combined with KBS. The latter’s ubiquity in all key policy areas and 
research programmes was equalled by its conceptual indefiniteness. The 
European Commission’s discourse regarding KBS and economy did not 
identify the choice of knowledge, leading Kuhn to conclude that KBS was an 
“ideological title” (ibid. p. 5) for ambitious global companies and their profit-
chasing activities based on a number of factors that included knowledge. A 
knowledge-based society became a synonym for economic competitiveness. It 
remains a top-down ideology that “has never been a subject for any bottom 
up decision process in which the citizens were involved. Rather the opposite 
is the case” (ibid. p. 6). It punishes the unemployed workers with a precarious 
life as they suffer from political and economic decision-taking more than from 
knowledge factors.      
 
Moratti’s 2003 Reform was a sign of the convergence of Northern Italy with 
such continent-wide goals within the EU’s broad policy-making practice. 
Education policy has increasingly incorporated the Bologna Process on 
Higher Education, part of the internationalisation process in which an inter-
governmental quality control process provides recognition of degrees and 
thus an integrated university scenario and facilitation of work mobility and 
employability. Also significant was the Copenhagen Process for Vocational 
Education and Training. Performativity is framed within international 
comparative tables such as with PISA. This involves education measurements 
of students’ performance in reading, mathematics and science. It ties what the 
Maastricht Treaty defined as autonomous activity at state level – such as the 
determination of content and its ‘weight’ in education curricula and 
syllabuses – to outcome measures and international performance standards. 
The EU open method of consultation was designed on consensus, and articles 
149 and 150 of the Treaty on education and training limited EU responsibility 
to coordinate, supplement, and support individual member-states. The latter 
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remain autonomous in determining content, organisation, and diversity 
issues. However, it was hard to deny that by the 1990s, not only did the 
continent remain a determining factor in economic development, it was also 
in education and training provision. The tradition of Cuoco’s passive 
revolution was at work; hegemonic economies were powerful enough to send 
their ideologies to peripheral outreaches. Furthermore, the 2008 Isfol report 
concluded that Structural Fund money did not complement but rather 
substitute state financial support in Italy.  
 
Conclusion 
 
There is a general consensus that the concept of passive revolution 
fundamentally refers to ruptural conditions of modern bourgeois state 
formation. Gramsci adopted it in his discussion of the nineteenth century 
Risorgimento that led to the unification of separate territories under the rule 
of the Piedmontese in the guise of the Italian nation-state. However, he also 
used the concept for phases subsequent to state formation especially in 
relation to strategies intent on conserving the bourgeois state during critical 
times when capital and/or the political state restructured and a weakened 
political leadership was challenged. If leadership strategies failed, other more 
drastic measures would follow, including suspension of democracy or 
austerity. This is what Gramsci must have thought when personally suffering 
the Fascist regime he considered a case of passive revolution. Just as the 
Italian state born from the Risorgimento was a case of passive revolution 
compared to what followed the 1789 French Revolution, one could argue the 
same for the Fascist regime when compared to developments following the 
Russian revolution.  
 
In 1946, the political state in Italy was restructured and transformed from a 
dictatorship to a liberal democracy; similarly the economy from war to peace. 
It was a broad industrialisation process that consolidated the upper classes 
but wrought change in the proletarian social class structure. With the 
protection of the Allies, members of the industrial alta borghesia that had 
collaborated with and served Mussolini in the war effort were restored to 
power. In its preparatory work for the Constituency Assembly in 1947, the 
Demaria economic commission from the Ministry of the Constituency 
consulted economic agents on their prospects. The study recorded the names 
of industrial companies in the north listed in the stock market at the time. 
Comparing such names with those enlisted in the 1993 data collected by 
Consob, as already mentioned above, confirmed Pirelli, Falck and Fiat as 
dominant or relevant players at the end of the twentieth century. In spite of 
crisis, capital accumulation processes of these three Groups were successful. 
Leading capitalists were not the only ones to be restored; Fascists returned to 
the police force and state administration. The DC began its uninterrupted 
decades of political rule with widespread political corruption, organised 
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militarised crime, and administrative inefficiency (Anderson, 2009, pp.278-
351) but conserving the bourgeois political state that, amongst others, meant 
no alternation in government. 
 
In the post-DC era, Dunford and Greco (2006) reported major achievements of 
Berlusconi’s Forza Italia and Bossi’s Lega Nord political alliance. 
Representing the Italian North as it experienced industrial difficulties, the 
alliance successfully attracted public money away from the south. The Cassa 
del Mezzogiorno was a public entity set up in 1950 intent on development in 
the south through public works and infrastructural projects, as well as 
assistance to investments. When its time limit ended, politicians extended 
assistance to southern development through its follow-up, the Agenzia del 
Mezzogiorno. However, the implementation of another revised follow-up 
system of that extension which stretched up to 1993, failed. A radical change 
in approach ensued. Laws 488/1992, 341/1995 and 662/1996 began to follow 
a nation-wide approach to identifying economically depressed areas instead 
of the previous focus restricted to the south. Viesti claimed the Berlusconi 
government sanctioned this transformation in order to satisfy northern and 
central lobbies (1996, in Dunford and Greco, 2006, p.117), redirecting public 
money to northern areas in crisis even if these were better off than those in 
the south. Having secured that central and northern regions were now 
eligible, the Tremonti Law 549/1995 provided investments and incentives for 
SMEs in regions eligible for state assistance. The change profited the North, 
conserving and consolidating in the process, the South’s subordination.  
 
Berlusconi revolutionised popular culture but the populist forces in the 
governments he headed, including the Lega Nord as the major political 
representative force in the NE, and the “absence of a clear political project”, 
suggested to Dunford and Greco that “elements of continuity remain as a 
result in part of the resilience of the old hegemonic bloc and the interests it 
represented” (2006, p.127). Meanwhile, as the Veneto suffered industrial 
slowdown (Revelli, 2016; esp. Chap.3), the political triumph of the alliance 
turned to sober considerations of paralysing crisis as the legal woes of the 
Lega Nord and Forza Italia leadership meant the two political parties were in 
trouble, struggling to keep their political profile alive. By the second decade 
of the new century, Berlusconi’s hold broke when, without a vote against, he 
was forced to resign.  Berlusconi’s fourth government fell to a new 
technocratic government led, significantly, by former EU Commissioner 
Mario Monti and constituted by unelected academics. Besides technocracy, 
another feature Gramsci associated with passive revolution was 
transformism. This was adopted and turned into an art by the political sector 
both pre- and post-Berlusconi described by Stella and Rizzo (2007) as the 
caste, la Casta. Hardly accountable to the electorate, political representatives 
changed colours regularly in order to join the victors who could grant them 
roles and placements in different institutions of political society. One was 
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hard-pressed to point out significant change in political strategy from the 
days of the Moderate Party, a sign for Gramsci of passive revolution.  
 
The case for a sequence of passive revolutions in the history of the Italian 
state does not exclude resistance; it enforces it further. Recalling resistance to 
the dominant capitalist class that challenged its political and hegemonic 
leadership limits the fatalism that accompanies such an interpretation of 
events. With Gramsci, passive revolution becomes a tool for analysis rather 
than a political programme (Q15: 62). Conversely, when adopted as a political 
programme, besides being Eurocentric and reformist, economistic 
frameworks simplify a complex dominance-consensus framework that 
ignores the subordinate are actively involved in their subordination and not 
helplessly subservient (Landy, 1994, p.40). These political programmes ignore 
the need for the education of workers to move from a class in itself to a class 
for itself (S. Hall in ibid. p.41). Gramsci referred to intellectuals’ inability to 
understand and sympathise with dynamic mass movements pushing for 
change. He was actively involved in correcting this inability and was bitter 
when he concluded that institutions clamouring they were promoting 
working class interests (trade unions, political parties) were doing otherwise.  
 
Gramsci’s elaboration of the concept of passive revolution has been adopted 
in this paper to examine not only state formation following the Risorgimento 
and the Fascist period but also the second half of the twentieth century as a 
period during which economic and political hierarchies attempted to 
conserve power in times of complex transformation characterised by crisis 
and capital restructuring. These attempts included passive revolutionary 
strategies such as transformism and technicisation but also reformist policy 
such as educational legislation setting favourable conditions for social 
reproduction and hegemonic stability. In the initial stages of their political 
rule, the Piedmontese, Fascists and Christian Democrats delivered three 
education acts. These have been interpreted as attempts to turn passive 
revolution phases of change and conservation into stable hegemonic ones. In 
the 1970s, as the post-war reconstruction boom became a fading memory and 
the days of mass production companies’ high and stable growth rates were 
apparently relegated to the past, the rise of the ID organisation of production 
in the NE was rapid and impressive. However, its traditional SMEs were 
subordinated by MNEs, protagonists in the context of freely mobile capital. 
As the new bourgeois MNE leadership from the Italian NE established its 
status alongside that of the traditional alta borghesia of the NW, together they 
called for higher skills and knowledge instruction which the Moratti 2003 
Reform attempted to deliver in line with continental policy-making. 
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